We first study an optimal stopping problem in which a player (an agent) uses a discrete stopping time in order to stop optimally a payoff process whose risk is evaluated by a (non-linear) g-expectation. We then consider a non-zero-sum game on discrete stopping times with two agents who aim at minimizing their respective risks. The payoffs of the agents are assessed by g-expectations (with possibly different drivers for the different players). By using the results of the first part, combined with some ideas of S. Hamadène and J. Zhang, we construct a Nash equilibrium point of this game by a recursive procedure. Our results are obtained in the case of a standard Lipschitz driver g without any additional assumption on the driver besides that ensuring the monotonicity of the corresponding g-expectation.
Introduction
Initiated by Bismut Bismut (1976) , Bismut (1973) (in the linear case), the theory of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs for short) has been further developed by Pardoux and Peng Pardoux and Peng (1990) in their seminal paper. The theory of BSDEs has found a number of applications in finance, among which pricing and hedging of European options, recursive utilities, risk measurement. BSDEs induce a family of operators, the so-called g-conditional expectations, which have proved useful in the literature on (nonlinear) dynamic risk measures (cf., e.g., , Rosazza-Gianin (2006) ). We recall that the g-conditional expectation at time t ∈ [0, T ] (where T > 0 is a fixed time horizon, and g is a Lipschitz driver) is the operator which maps a given terminal condition ξ (where ξ is a square-integrable random variable, measurable with respect to the information at time T ) to the position at time t of (the first component of) the solution of the BSDE with parameters (g, ξ) . This operator is denoted by E On the other hand, zero-sum Dynkin games have been introduced by Dynkin in Dynkin (1969) in the discrete-time framework. Since then, there have been lots of contributions to zero-sum Dynkin games both in discrete time and in continuous time (cf., e.g., Bismut (1977) , Neveu (1972) , Alario-Nazaret et al. (1982) , Lepeltier and Maingueneau (1984) ). A prominent financial example is given by the pricing problem of game options (also known as Israeli options), introduced by Kifer in Kifer (2000) . Compared to the zero-sum case, there have been fewer works on the non-zero-sum case. We can quote Hamadène and Zhang (2010) , Laraki and Solan (2013) , in the continuous-time setting, and Morimoto (1986) , Ohtsubo (1987) , Shmaya and Solan (2004) , in the discrete-time setting. For a recent survey on zero-sum and non-zero-sum Dynkin games the reader is referred to Kifer (2013) . In all the above references the players' payoffs are assessed by "classical" mathematical expectations. In the recent years, some authors (cf. Dumitrescu et al. (2013) , and Bayraktar and Yao (2015) ) have considered "generalized" Dynkin games in continuous time where the "classical" expectations are replaced by more general (non-linear) functionals. All these extensions are limited to the zero-sum case.
In the present paper, we address a game problem with two "stoppers" whose profits (or payoffs) are assessed by non-linear dynamic risk measures and who aim at minimizing their risk. More concretely, the following situation is of interest to us: we are given two adapted processes X and Y with X ≤ Y and X T = Y T a.s. We consider a game option in discrete time, that is, a contract between two "stoppers" (a seller and a buyer) who can act only at given times 0 = t 0 < t 1 < . . . < t n = T , where n ∈ N. The two agents can thus choose their strategies only among the discrete stopping times with values in the grid {t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t n }. We denote by T d 0,T this set of stopping times. Recall that the game option gives the buyer the right to exercise at any (discrete) stopping time τ 1 ∈ T d 0,T and the seller the right to cancel at any (discrete) stopping time τ 2 ∈ T d 0,T . In financial terms, we could say that both the seller's cancellation strategy and the buyer's exercise strategy are of Bermudan type. If the buyer exercises at time τ 1 before the seller cancels, then the seller pays to the buyer the amount X τ 1 ; otherwise, the buyer receives from the seller the amount Y τ 2 at the cancellation time τ 2 . The difference Y τ 2 − X τ 2 ≥ 0 is interpreted as a penalty which the seller pays to the buyer in the case of an early cancellation of the contract. To summarize, if the seller chooses a cancellation time τ 2 and the buyer chooses an exercise time τ 1 , the former pays to the latter the payoff I(τ 1 , τ 2 ) := X τ 1 I {τ 1 ≤τ 2 } + Y τ 2 I {τ 2 <τ 1 } at time τ 1 ∧ τ 2 . The seller's payoff at time τ 1 ∧ τ 2 is equal to −I(τ 1 , τ 2 ).
We emphasize that our aim here is not to determine a "fair price" (or a "fair premium") for the game option, but rather to determine an "equilibrium" for the game problem related to the risk minimization of both the seller and the buyer.
The seller and the buyer are assumed to evaluate the risk of their payoffs in a (possibly) different manner.
The dynamic risk measure ρ f 1 (resp. ρ f 2 ) of the buyer (resp. the seller) is induced by a BSDE with driver f 1 (resp. f 2 ). Up to a minus sign, ρ f 1 (resp. ρ f 2 ) corresponds to the family of f 1 -conditional expectations (resp. f 2 -conditional expectations).
If, at time 0, the buyer chooses τ 1 as exercise time and the seller chooses τ 2 as cancellation time, the buyer's (resp. seller's) risk at time 0 is thus given by
The goal of each of the agents is to minimize his/her risk. We are interested in finding an "equilibrium" pair of discrete stopping times (τ * 1 , τ * 2 ) for this problem, that is, a pair
T such that the first agent's risk attains its minimum at τ * 1 when the strategy of the second one is fixed at τ * 2 , and the second agent's risk attains its minimum at τ * 2 when the strategy of the first one is fixed at τ * 1 . In other words, we are looking for a pair
In the terminology of game theory, the above game problem is of a non-zero-sum type, and a pair (τ * 1 , τ * 2 ) satisfying the above properties corresponds to a Nash equilibrium point of this non-zero-sum game. This game problem can be seen as a "generalized" non-zero-sum Dynkin game problem (the term "generalized" refers to the fact that our problem involves non-linear expectations instead of classical expectations). Note that in the trivial case where f 1 = f 2 = 0, our game reduces to a classical zero-sum Dynkin game (with classical expectations). Let us also mention that we can easily incorporate in our framework the situation where the seller and/or the buyer apply their respective risk measures to their net gains (that is the payoff minus the initial price of the game option) instead of to their payoffs. If the initial price of the option is given by x (where x > 0), the buyer's (resp. seller's) net gain at time τ 1 ∧ τ 2 is given by I(τ 1 , τ 2 ) − x (resp. x − I(τ 1 , τ 2 )).
We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium point for the non-zero-sum Dynkin game problem described above by using a constructive approach similar to that of Hamadène and Zhang (2010) , , and .
This approach requires some results on optimal stopping with one agent. We are thus led to considering first the following family of problems:
where T d t k ,T denotes the set of discrete stopping times valued in {t k , . . . , t n } and where ξ is a given square-integrable adapted process. We characterize the sequence of random variables (V (t k )) k∈N via a backward recursive construction. We also show that the stopping time τ * := τ * (t k ) := inf{t ∈ {t k , . . . , t n }, V (t) = ξ t }, which belongs to T d t k ,T , is optimal for (1) at time t k . To prove our results, we use a generalization of the martingale approach to the case of g-conditional expectations in discrete time. Our results are established without any additional assumption on the driver g besides that ensuring the monotonicity of the corresponding g-conditional expectations. In particular, we do not make an assumption of "groundedness" on g (that is, the assumption g(t, 0, 0, 0) = 0), nor do we make an assumption of concavity/convexity on g, nor an assumption of "independence from y" (that is, g(t, y, z, k) = g(t, y ′ , z, k), for all y, y ′ ∈ R), which are sometimes made in the literature. Optimal stopping problems with one agent whose payoff is assessed by a non-linear expectation have been largely studied. A continuous-time version of Problem (1) has been considered in El , Quenez and Sulem (2014) and Grigorova et al. (2015) . Related works include, but are not limited to, Bayraktar et al. (2010) , Bayraktar and Yao (2011) . The discrete-time version of Problem (1) has been introduced by Krätschmer and Schoenmakers in Krätschmer and Schoenmakers (2010) , Example 2.7, who address the problem under stronger assumptions on the driver g than those made in the present paper. In particular, the authors of Krätschmer and Schoenmakers (2010) need the zeroone law for g-expectation, and the property E g t,T (ξ) = ξ, for all t, for all ξ square-integrable F t -measurable. These two properties do not hold for a general Lipschitz driver g. For this reason, the results from Krätschmer and Schoenmakers (2010) are not applicable in our framework; thus, we have been led to studying Problem (1) by using different techniques.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we set the framework and the notation. Section 3 is dedicated to the optimal stopping problem with one player. In Subsection 3.1, we define the notion of g-(super)martingales in discrete time and we give some of their properties; in Subsection 3.2, we characterize the value function of our optimal stopping problem and we show the existence of optimal stopping times. In Section 4, we formulate our non-zero-sum Dynkin game with two players and we show the existence of a Nash equilibrium. In Section 5, we briefly comment upon possible extensions of our results. The Appendix contains a useful property of g-expectations (Prop. A.1), along with some related remarks, as well as the proof of an easy result from Section 3.
The framework
Let T be a fixed positive real number. Let (E, K) be a measurable space equipped with a σ-finite positive measure ν. Let (Ω, F, P ) be a (complete) probability space equipped with a one-dimensional Brownian motion W and with an independent Poisson random measure N (dt, de) with compensator dt ⊗ ν(de). We denote byÑ (dt, de) the compensated process, i.e.Ñ (dt, de) :=Ñ (dt, de) − dt ⊗ ν(de). Let F = {F t : t ∈ [0, T ]} be the (complete) natural filtration associated with W and N . We use the following notation:
• L 2 (F T ) is the set of random variables which are F T -measurable and square-integrable.
• L 2 ν is the set of K-measurable functions ℓ :
• H 2,T is the set of real-valued predictable processes φ such that
• H 2,T ν is the set of real-valued processes l : (ω, t, e) ∈ Ω × [0, T ] × E → l t (ω, e) ∈ R which are predictable, that is (P ⊗ K)-measurable, and such that
• S 2,T is the set of real-valued RCLL adapted processes ϕ such that ϕ 2 S 2,T := E(sup t∈[0,T ] |ϕ t | 2 ) < ∞. We recall the following terminology from BSDE theory.
Definition 2.1 (Lipschitz driver, standard data) A function g is said to be a driver if the following two conditions hold:
•
A driver g is called a Lipschitz driver (or a standard Lipschitz driver) if moreover there exists a constant K ≥ 0 such that dP ⊗ dt-a.e. , for each (
A pair (g, ξ) such that g is a Lipschitz driver and ξ ∈ L 2 (Ω, F T , P ) is called a pair of standard data, or a pair of standard parameters.
Let (ξ, g) be a pair of standard data. The BSDE associated with Lipschitz driver g, terminal time T , and terminal condition ξ, is formulated as follows:
We recall that the above BSDE admits a unique solution triplet (Y, Z, k) in the space ] is the family of g-conditional evaluations of ξ in the vocabulary of S. Peng). Recall also (cf., e.g., El Karoui et al. El ) that if the terminal time is given by a stopping time τ ∈ T 0,T and if ξ is F τ -measurable, the solution of the BSDE associated with terminal time τ , terminal condition ξ and Lipschitz driver g is defined as the solution of the BSDE with (fixed) terminal time T , terminal condition ξ and Lipschitz driver g τ given by g τ (t, y, z, ℓ) := g(t, y, z, ℓ)I {t≤τ } .
The first component of this solution is thus equal to
If T ′ represents a given maturity and η a financial position at time
thus represents a dynamic risk measure induced by the BSDE with driver g. In order to ensure the monotonicity property of ρ g , that is, the monotonicity property with respect to the financial position, which is naturally required for risk measures, we assume from now on that the driver g satisfies the following assumption (cf. (Quenez and Sulem, 2013, Thm. 4.2, combined with Prop. 3 .2) and the references therein).
where the mapping
Assume, moreover, that θ is uniformly bounded, in the sense that, dP ⊗ dt-a.e. , for each
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be a given F-adapted square-integrable process modelling an agent's dynamic financial position. The agent is allowed to "stop" only at given times 0 = t 0 < t 1 < . . . < t n = T , where n ∈ N. The agent's risk is assessed through a dynamic risk measure ρ g induced by a BSDE with a given Lipschitz driver g; the dynamic risk measure ρ g corresponds (up to a minus sign) to the family of g-conditional expectations . The agent's aim at time 0 is to choose his/her strategy in such a way that the risk of his/her position from "time 0-perspective" be minimal. The minimal risk at time 0 is defined by
We have V (0) = −V 0 , where
We are thus facing an optimal stopping problem in discrete time with g-expectation. Our purpose in this section is to compute or characterize the minimal risk measure V (0) (or equivalently, V 0 ) and to study the question of the existence of an optimal stopping time. In order to simplify the notation, we suppose from now on that the terminal time T is in N and that t k = k, for all k = 1, . . . , n. In this case, the set
of stopping times whose values are almost surely in the set {k, k + 1, . . . , T }. We will use the notation F d for the filtration (F k ) k∈{0,1,...,T } .
Discrete-time g-(super)martingales
We introduce the notion of discrete-time g-(super)martingales, which is to be compared with the definition of a E g -supermartingale (in continuous time), respectively E g -martingale (in continuous time).
Definition 3.1 Let (φ k ) k∈{0,1,...,T } be a sequence of square-integrable random variables, adapted to (F k ) k∈{0,1,...,T } . We say that the sequence
is a E g -martingale (in continuous time) with respect to the filtration F, then (φ k ) k∈{0,1,...,T } is a g-martingale in discrete time in the sense of Definition 3.1.
Remark 3.2 In the case where g ≡ 0 (corresponding to the classical expectation), if (φ k ) k∈{0,1,...,T } is a discrete-time martingale with respect to (F k ) k∈{0,1,...,T } , then (φ k ) k∈{0,1,...,T } can be extended into a continuous-time martingale with respect to F (with time parameter t in [0, T ]) by setting φ t := φ k , for all t ∈ (k, k + 1), for all k ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. This statement does not necessarily hold true in the case of a general driver g.
Remark 3.3 Let (φ t ) be a square-integrable adapted process. We recall that by definition
0,T . Then, the stopped process (φ k∧τ ) k∈{0,1,...,T } is a g τ -supermartingale (resp. a g τ -martingale) in discrete time.
, it is sufficient to prove the following:
We write
Due to the definition of the solution of a standard BSDE with a stopping time as a terminal time, we have
For the second term on the right-hand side of equation (8) we have
Indeed, after noticing that I {τ ≥k+1} is F k -measurable, we apply Proposition A.1 to obtain
By using the fact that g (k+1)∧τ I {τ ≥k+1} = g k+1 I {τ ≥k+1} and by applying Proposition A.1 again, we get
As φ is a g-supermartingale in discrete time, we have I {τ ≥k+1} E g k,k+1 (φ k+1 ) ≤ I {τ ≥k+1} φ k = I {τ ≥k+1} φ k∧τ , which proves the inequality (10). From (9) and (10) we get the desired inequality (7). The theorem is thus proved.
Remark 3.4 We know that a "classical" (super)martingale in discrete time, stopped at a stopping time τ , is again a (super)martingale. A g-(super)martingale in discrete time, stopped at a stopping time τ ∈ T d 0,T , is generally not a g-(super)martingale, but a g τ -(super)martingale (in virtue of the previous Theorem 3.1). This is illustrated by the following example. Let g be a driver which does not depend on y, z, and ℓ (i.e. g(ω, t, y, ℓ) ≡ g(ω, t)). Recall that in this case the solution Y of the BSDE with driver g and terminal condition ξ is given explicitly by
Assume that g is positive. Let φ be a g-martingale in discrete time and take τ ≡ k, where k ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. By applying (13) with ξ := φ k , we obtain
the inequality being due to the positivity of g. Hence, φ stopped at k is not a g-martingale in discrete time.
We now establish an "optional sampling" result for g-supermartingales (resp. for gmartingales). The result can be obtained as a corollary of the previous theorem.
Corollary 3.1 Let (φ k ) k∈{0,1,...,T } be a g-supermartingale (resp. a g-martingale) in discrete time. Then, for σ, τ in T d
0,T such that σ ≤ τ a.s., we have
Proof : We prove the result for the case of a g-supermartingale; the case of a g-martingale can be treated similarly. Let σ, τ in T d 0,T be such that σ ≤ τ a.s. We notice that it suffices to prove the following property:
Indeed, this property proven, we will have
which will conclude the proof. Let us now prove property (14). We proceed by backward induction. At the final time T we have
We suppose that the property (14) holds true for k + 1. Then, by using this induction hypothesis, the time-consistency and the monotonicity of the g-conditional expectation (the latter property holds under Assumption 2.1), we get
In order to conclude, it remains to prove
We have
where we have used Theorem 3.1 to obtain the inequality. By Proposition A.1, we have
According to the convention given in Remark A.2, the "driver" g (k+1)∧τ (s, y, z, ℓ)I {τ <k} is here equal to g (k+1)∧τ (s, y, z, ℓ)I {τ <k} I ]τ,T ] (s), which is equal to zero. Hence, we have
where the last equality is due to the F τ -measurability of φ τ I {τ <k} . From equations (16) and (17) we deduce (15). The proposition is thus proved.
Discrete-time g-Snell envelope and optimal stopping times
We now turn to the optimal stopping problem of the beginning of the section. As is usual in optimal control, we embed the above optimization problem (6) in a larger class of problems by considering
The following definition is analogous to the definition of the Snell envelope of a given process in discrete time, where we have replaced the mathematical expectation of the classical setting by a g-expectation. We define the process (U k ) k∈{0,1,...,T } by backward induction as follows:
From (19) we see by backward induction that (U k ) is a well-defined, (F k )-adapted sequence of square integrable random variables. The sequence (U k ) will be called the g-Snell envelope in discrete time of (ξ k ).
We now give a characterization of the g-Snell envelope in discrete time of (ξ k ).
Proposition 3.1 The sequence (U k ) k∈{0,1,...,T } defined in equation (19) is the smallest gsupermartingale in discrete time dominating the sequence (ξ k ) k∈{0,1,...,T } .
The proof of the above proposition is similar to the proof in the case of a classical expectation and is given in the Appendix for reader's convenience.
Let k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T } be given. We define the following stopping time:
The following propositions hold true.
Proposition 3.2 Let k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}. Let ν k be the stopping time defined in (20). The sequence (U l∧ν k ) l∈{k,...,T } is a g ν k -martingale in discrete time.
Proof : Let l ∈ {k, . . . , T − 1}. We show that
As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we have, by definition of the solution of the BSDE with a stopping time as a terminal time,
For the second term on the right-hand side of equation (21) we use again the same arguments as those of the proof of Theorem 3.1 (cf. equations (11) and (12)) to show
From the definition of ν k we see that U l > ξ l on the set {ν k ≥ l + 1}. Combining this observation with the definition of U gives U l = E g l,l+1 (U l+1 ) on the set {ν k ≥ l + 1}. Hence,
Plugging (22) and (23) in (21) gives the desired result.
In the following proposition we show that the stopping time ν k defined in (20) is optimal for the optimization problem (18) at time k and that the value function V k of the problem is equal to U k (the g-Snell envelope in discrete time of (ξ k )).
Theorem 3.2 For k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T },
where ν k := inf{l ∈ {k, . . . , T } :
Proof : In the case where k = T the result is trivially true. Suppose k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}. By using Proposition 3.2 and Corollary 3.1 (applied with σ = k and τ = T ), and the fact that U ν k = ξ ν k , we obtain
Let ν ∈ T k,T . By using Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 (applied with σ = k and τ = ν), as well as the monotonicity of the functional E g 0,ν (·), we get
Combining equations (25) and (26) gives the desired conclusion.
Remark 3.5 Families of non-linear operators {E t (·) : t ∈ [0, T ]} indexed by a single index (as opposed to doubly-indexed families) are considered in several papers in the literature on optimal stopping with non-linear functionals (cf., e.g., Krätschmer and Schoenmakers (2010) , and Bayraktar and Yao (2011) ). We note that we work here with the doubly-indexed family of operators {E 
. By using the consistency property of g-conditional expectations, it can be shown that this assumption is equivalent to the assumption (mentioned in the introduction) E g t,T (η) = η, for all t ∈ [0, T ], for all η ∈ L 2 (F t ).
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A non-zero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time related to risk minimization
We now consider a game problem which is slightly more general than that of the introduction. We are given two agents A 1 and A 2 whose payoffs/financial positions are defined via four F-adapted sequences X 1 , X 2 , Y 1 , Y 2 . We make the following assumptions:
The set of strategies of each of the agents at time 0 is T d 0,T . We emphasize that both agents use discrete stopping times as strategies. If the first agent's strategy is τ 1 ∈ T d 0,T and the second agent's strategy is τ 2 ∈ T d 0,T , the payoff of the first (resp. second) agent at time τ 1 ∧ τ 2 is given by:
where we have adopted the following convention: when τ 1 = τ 2 , it is the first player who is responsible for stopping the game.
The agents A 1 and A 2 evaluate the risk of their respective payoffs in a (possibly) different manner.
More precisely, we are now given two standard Lipschitz drivers f 1 and f 2 . The dynamic risk measure of the first agent is equal to ρ f 1 = −E f 1 and the dynamic risk measure of the second agent is equal to ρ f 2 = −E f 2 .
If the first agent's strategy is τ 1 ∈ T d 0,T and the second agent's strategy is τ 2 ∈ T d 0,T , the first agent's (resp. second agent's) risk at time 0 is thus given by −J 1 (τ 1 , τ 2 ) (resp. −J 2 (τ 1 , τ 2 )) where
The two agents aim at minimizing the risk of their payoffs.
The problem with the game option presented in the introduction can be seen as a particular case of the game described above, with the first agent A 1 corresponding to the buyer of the game option, the second agent A 2 corresponding to the seller, and with X 1 = −Y 2 = X and Y 1 = −X 2 = Y . Let us emphasize that even in this particular case where the payoffs of the two agents are equal up to a minus sign, the game is of a nonzero-sum type due to the non-linearity of the dynamic risk measures. The situation, also mentioned in the introduction, where the seller and/or the buyer of the option apply their risk measures to their net gains, also enters in the above general framework. For instance, if the seller of the option takes into account his/her net gain, while the buyer considers the payoff of the option only, we set: X 1 = X, Y 1 = Y , Y 2 = −X + x, and X 2 = −Y + x, where x > 0 is the initial price of the option.
In this section, we investigate the question of the existence of a Nash equilibrium point for the general game described above. 
T is called a Nash equilibrium point for the above non-zero-sum Dynkin game if
In other words, a pair of strategies is a Nash equilibrium of the game if any unilateral deviation from that strategy on the part of one of the agents (the other agent's strategy remaining fixed) does not reduce his/her risk.
A preliminary result
We begin by a preliminary proposition in which we show that interchanging the strict and large inequalities in the expression of the payoff process does not change the corresponding value functions. This result will be used in the construction of a Nash equilibrium point in the following sub-section.
Let g be a standard driver and µ ∈ T d 0,T . For each k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T }, let
For each k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T }, let
which correspond to the g µ -Snell envelope in discrete time of (ξ k ) and (ξ k ) respectively. Then, the following properties hold true:
Remark 4.1 The result can be seen as an analogue in our framework of a result by Lepeltier and Maingueneau (1984) (lemma 5) shown in a continuous-time framework with right-continuous payoffs and classical expectation.
Proof : Let us prove (i). We proceed by backward induction. A direct computation gives
We suppose now thatŪ k+1 = Y µ = U k+1 a.s. on {µ ≤ k}.
By using the definition of U k , we have
Now, by the definition of ξ k , we get
Moreover, by Proposition A.1 and the induction hypothesis, we get
Now, the "driver" g µ (ω, s, y, z)I {µ(ω)≤k−1} is equal to g(ω, s, y, z)I {s≤µ(ω)≤k−1} I ]k,T ] (s) (according to the convention used in Prop. A.1), which is equal to zero. Moreover,
(Y µ I {µ≤k−1} ) = Y µ I {µ≤k−1} a.s. By combining this observation with equations (27) and (28), we get U k = Y µ a.s. on {µ ≤ k − 1}. By similar arguments we show thatŪ k = Y µ a.s. on {µ ≤ k − 1} (to obtain this claim, it is sufficient to replace U byŪ , and ξ byξ in equation (27)). Property (i) is thus proven. Let us prove property (ii). We proceed again by backward induction. At the final time T we have U T = ξ T =ξ T =Ū T (due to the assumption X T = Y T ). Suppose thatŪ k+1 = U k+1 . Let us proveŪ k = U k . We note that ξ k =ξ k on the set {µ = k} c . This observation, the induction hypothesis, and the definitions of U k andŪ k lead to the equality U k =Ū k on the set {µ = k} c . It remains to show that the equality also holds true on the set {µ = k}. By using the definition of U k , the definition of ξ k and Proposition A.1, we get
Now, by property (i) which we have just proved, we have
(Y k I {µ=k} ).
As the "driver" g µ I {µ=k} is equal to 0 and
From the previous three expressions, we obtain U k I {µ=k} = Y k I {µ=k} . Similarly, by using the definition ofŪ k , the definition ofξ k , Proposition A.1, and property (i), we get
Thus, the equalityŪ k I {µ=k} = U k I {µ=k} holds, which concludes the proof.
Construction of a Nash equilibrium point
Following ideas of Hamadène and Zhang (2010) , and Hamadène and Hassani (2014), we construct a Nash equilibrium point of the game described above by a recursive procedure. We also rely on the preliminary result of the previous subsection (Prop. 4.1) and on the results of Section 3.
Theorem 4.1 Our non-zero-sum game with g-expectations in discrete time admits a Nash equilibrium point.
To prove this theorem, we construct a pair (τ 2n+1 , τ 2n+2 ) n∈N of non-increasing sequences of stopping times and we show that the limit (as n → ∞) is a NEP of the game defined in Section 2. We set τ 1 := T and τ 2 := T . We suppose that the stopping times τ 2n−1 and τ 2n have been defined. We define f 2n+1 1
is a standard Lipschitz driver, as f 1 is a standard Lipschitz driver. We set, for all k ∈ {0, . . . , T },
Due to Theorem 3.2, the stopping timeτ 2n+1 is optimal for the above optimization problem (30) at time 0: more precisely, we have
).
Moreover, thanks to Proposition 4.1 applied with µ := τ 2n and g := f 1 , we have
We gather some more observations on the objects defined above in the following Remark 4.2 and Proposition 4.2.
Remark 4.2 (i) For all n ∈ N, τ 2n+1 is a stopping time (this observation follows directly from the definition of τ 2n+1 ).
(ii) For all n ∈ N, for all τ
Moreover, we have the following proposition.
(ii) For all n ∈ N,τ 2n+1 = inf{k ∈ {0, . . . , T } :
Proof : Let us prove (i). From the definition of ξ 2n+1 we have
Thus,
where we have used equation (33) to obtain the last but one equality, and equation (32) to obtain the last. Let us prove (ii). By using the definition ofτ 2n+1 , and that of ξ 2n+1 , we havẽ
Thanks to this observation and to the previous property (i), we obtaiñ
Similarly to the definitions of (30), we set
We note that the objects defined in the previous equation (34) 
Proof :
We suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists m ≥ 1 such that P (τ m < τ m+2 ) > 0, and we set n := min{m ≥ 1 : P (τ m <τ m+2 ) > 0}. We have n ≥ 3. The definition of n impliesτ n+1 ≤ τ n−1 . This observation, combined with the definition of τ n+1 and with the inequality of part (ii) of proposition 4.2, gives τ n+1 =τ n+1 I {τ n+1 <τn} + τ n−1 I {τ n+1 =τn} .
For similar reasons we have
For the easing of the presentation, we set Γ := {τ n <τ n+2 }. On the set Γ, we have:
1. τ n <τ n+2 ≤ τ n+1 (the last inequality being again due to property (ii) of Prop. 4.2).
2. τ n+1 = τ n−1 . This observation is due to 1, combined with the equality (35).
3. ξ n+2 = ξ n . This is a direct consequence of 2 and the definitions of ξ n+2 and ξ n .
4. τ n =τ n . We prove that {τ n = τ n−1 }∩Γ = ∅ which, together with the expression (36), gives the desired statement. Due to (36) we have {τ n = τ n−1 } = {τ n = τ n−1 } ∩ {τ n = τ n−2 }. Thus, {τ n = τ n−1 } ∩ Γ = {τ n = τ n−1 , τ n = τ n−2 <τ n+2 }. Now, we havẽ τ n ≤ τ n−2 (due to the definition of n). Thus, {τ n = τ n−1 } ∩ Γ = {τ n = τ n−1 ≤ τ n = τ n−2 <τ n+2 } = ∅, the last equality being due toτ n+2 ≤ τ n−1 .
We note that combining properties 1 and 4 givesτ n <τ n+2 on Γ. We will obtain a contradiction with this property. To this end, let us show that
By definition ofτ n , we have W ñ τn = ξ ñ τn . This observation combined with property 3 gives W ñ τn = ξ ñ τn = ξ n+2 τn on Γ. Thus, in order to show equality (37) it suffices to show
In the following computations f n+2 i is equal to f n+2 1 (resp. f n+2 2 ) if n + 2 is an odd (resp. even) number; similarly, f n i is equal to f n 1 (resp. f n 2 ) if n is an odd (resp. even) number. By using property 4 and Proposition A.1 of the appendix, applied with A := Γ which is F τn -measurable, we obtain I Γ W n+2 τn
). Now, by using the definitions of f n+2 i and f n i , as well as property 2, we have:
. By using this observation and property 3, we obtain E
. By using again Proposition A.1 from the appendix, we get E
Combining the previous equalities leads to
where we have again used property 4 to obtain the last equality. The proof of equality (38), and hence also of equality (37), is thus completed. From equality (37) and from the definition ofτ n+2 we deduceτ n+2 ≤τ n on Γ, which is in contradiction withτ n <τ n+2 on Γ. The proposition is thus proved. Corollary 4.1 (i) For all n ≥ 2, τ n+1 =τ n+1 I {τ n+1 <τn} + τ n−1 I {τ n+1 =τn} .
(ii) For all n ≥ 2,τ n+1 = τ n+1 ∧ τ n .
Proof : The proof of assertion (i) is a direct consequence of the definition of τ n+1 , combined with the previous proposition 4.3 and with property (ii) of proposition 4.2. Let us prove (ii). By using the previous assertion (i), we obtain
By using the previous proposition 4.3 and property (ii) of proposition 4.2, we conclude that τ n+1 ∧ τ n =τ n+1 I {τ n+1 <τn} +τ n+1 I {τ n+1 =τn} =τ n+1 .
Lemma 4.1 On {τ n = τ n−1 } we have τ m = T, ∀m ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The proof is similar to that of lemma 3.1 in Hamadène and Zhang (2010) and is given for reader's convenience. We proceed by induction. The result is trivially true for n = 2. Assume that the result holds for n − 1, where n ≥ 3. From the expression of τ n from the previous Corollary 4.1, part (i), we see that τ n = τ n−2 on {τ n = τ n−1 }, and we conclude by using the induction hypothesis.
Proposition 4.4 The following inequalities hold true:
In other words, the strategy τ 2n+1 is optimal for the first agent at time 0 when the second agent's strategy is fixed at τ 2n . The strategy τ 2n+2 is optimal for the second agent at time 0 when the first agent's strategy is fixed at τ 2n+1 .
Proof : We will prove the first inequality. The second one can be proved by means of similar arguments. Due to equation (31), we have
On the other hand,
where Lemma 4.1 and Assumption (A2) (that is, the assumption X 1 T = Y 1 T ) have been used to obtain the last equality. We use Remark 4.2, Corollary 4.1 (part (ii)), and the optimality ofτ 2n+1 to obtain , which, combined with (39), gives the desired result. (ξ 2n+1 τ 2n+1 ). We conlude that the stopping time τ 2n+1 is also optimal (at time t = 0) for the optimization problem (30).
We define τ * 1 and τ * 2 by τ * 1 := lim n→∞ τ 2n+1 and τ * 2 := lim n→∞ τ 2n . We note that τ * 1 and τ * 2 are stopping times in T d 0,T . We now prove that we can pass to the limit in the inequalities of the previous proposition. and converges toξ τ * 2 τ (ω). Finally, we check that E(sup n (ξ 2n+1 τ ) 2 ) < +∞, which is due to the inequality |ξ 2n+1 τ | 2 ≤ 2|X 1 τ | 2 + 2|Y 1 τ 2n | 2 , to the assumption (A3) , and to the square integrability of X 1 . The proof is thus complete.
Conclusion:
We deduce from the previous two propositions (Prop. 4.4 and Prop. 4.5) that J 1 (τ, τ * 2 ) ≤ J 1 (τ * 1 , τ * 2 ), for all τ ∈ T d 0,T , and J 2 (τ * 1 , τ ) ≤ J 2 (τ * 1 , τ * 2 ), for all τ ∈ T d 0,T ; in other words, (τ * 1 , τ * 2 ) is a NEP of our Dynkin game.
Remark 4.4 We note that the proof of Proposition 4.5 relies on the fact that the stopping times in the framework of our paper are valued in a finite set. Proposition 4.5 (more specifically, statement (ii)) seems difficult to establish in a continuous time framework. More precisely, due to the fact that a convergent sequence of reals in [0, T ] is not necessarily stationary, it is not so clear that it is possible to derive statement (ii) of Proposition 4.5 from Proposition 4.4, contrary to the discrete case.
Further developments
The results given in the present paper can be generalized to the case of strategies valued in a finite set of stopping times. More specifically, let us consider the following setting: Let T be a positive real number. Let K ∈ N. Let θ 0 , θ 1 , ..., θ K be K + 1 (distinct) F-stopping times with values in [0, T ] such that 0 = θ 0 ≤ θ 1 ≤ . . . ≤ θ K = T a.s. We consider a stopper who, in each scenario ω ∈ Ω, can act only at times θ 0 (ω), θ 1 (ω), ...,θ K (ω). In other words, the stopper can choose his/her strategy among the stopping times τ of the form τ = K i=0 θ i 1 A i , where (A i ) i∈{0,...,K} is a partition of Ω such that A i ∈ F θ i , for all i ∈ {0, . . . , K}. We denote by Θ this set of stopping times. We are also given an F-adapted square-integrable payoff process (ξ t ) t∈ [0,T ] . In this framework the optimal stopping problem of Section 3 becomes: V 0 := sup τ ∈Θ E g 0,τ (ξ τ ). A game problem analogous to that of Section 4, where the set of stopping times T d 0,T is replaced by the set Θ, can also be formulated. In the particular case where the stopping times θ 0 , θ 1 , ..., θ K are strictly ordered (that is, 0 = θ 0 < θ 1 < ... < θ K = T a.s.), the two problems can be addressed by using techniques similar to those used in the present paper, combined with a change of variables. For the general case (cf. our ongoing work Grigorova and Quenez (2016) ), we need some additional arguments related to the work of Kobylanski and Quenez (2012) , Kobylanski et al. (2011) .
